The Assault on TORTOISE
In the midst of all this
the 3rd Carabiniers had been called upon to play
the major role in raising a further British armoured regiment in
In the meantime, Lt-General
William Slim, commanding the newly formed 14th Army, was forming plans for a
further offensive in the Arakan. When the Japanese had evicted 14th Indian
Division earlier in 1943, they had halted their advance along the line
Maungdaw/Buthidaung, two towns on either side of the Mayu range, connected by
the only metalled all-weather road in the area. This road ran along the
track-bed of a disused narrow gauge railway which, at the summit of the line,
ran through two tunnels, and the Japanese had spared no pains in fortifying the
position. The capture of this road, together with Maungdaw and Buthidaung, was
the primary objective of Slim's offensive, for
without possession of it troops east of the Mayu range could only be supplied
with difficulty, along a winding fair weather track that ran through the hills
several miles to the north. The route this track followed was called the
For the task Slim had
Lt-General A. F. P. Christison's 15th Corps,
comprising the veteran 5th Indian Division, the comparatively inexperienced 7th
Indian Division, two brigades 81st West African Division; and 25th
Dragoons, who would supply armoured support for the Corps' operations as
required.
5th Division would advance
down the coast on Maungdaw, whilst 7th Division moved on a parallel axis on the
other side of the range, and the West Africans operated well inland, guarding
the left flank.
Maungdaw fell on 9th
January 1944, but further progress to the south was denied 5th Division by
an extremely strong enemy position at Razabil, and 25th Dragoons were
called forward.
The regiment was at its
forward base area at Reju Khal
on the
On 26th January C Squadron
carried out an attack on a feature known as Tortoise Hill in company
with 161 Brigade. A preparatory air strike by Vengeance fighter-bombers
went into the target satisfactorily, but a follow-up by Liberator
bombers fell short amongst the tanks, damaging three and causing some
casualties amongst the crews. The remainder pressed on, plastering the position
with 75 and 37-mm fire, destroying bunkers and lacing the feature with machine
guns.
The Japanese, however, were
canny fighters, and retired to the reverse slopes whenever the British artillery
and tanks opened up, only to rush back and hurl showers of grenades at the
advancing 4/7th Rajput infantry whenever the fire
support lifted. By nightfall the position remained untaken.
The following day C
Squadron and the Rajputs tried again, without success,
but were now adapting their gunnery techniques to the particular requirements
of the battle, firing HE ahead of the infantry with gradual lifts until the
target bunker was hit, when a change was made to AP shot. At this point, the
infantry's mortars would open up on the crest and reverse slopes, compelling
the enemy to keep their heads tucked in.
On the 28th it was B
Squadron's turn to support the Rajputs, whilst A
Squadron worked with 4th Royal West Kents. Casualties
were inflicted on the enemy and several anti-tank guns knocked out, but
progress was painfully slow, and the Japanese were now being reinforced faster
than they could be killed. The tanks' movements were inhibited by soft ground
and chaungs which ran between banks twenty feet in
height, and the battle tailed off to a position of stalemate by the end of the
month, although the Dragoons had succeeded in bringing their bunkerbusting techniques to a fine art in co-operation with
the infantry.
At the beginning of
February, 25th Dragoons were ordered to cross the Mayu range by way of the
Afternote:
This action was supported
by MMGs of A Company 3/4 Bombay Grenadiers. The
company commander, Maj. AHJ Dunlop, went with the MMG sections onto the
position and whilst moving back down the hill was shot through the hand by a
sniper.
Tank Tracks to
by Bryan Perrett