2nd Battalion Worcestershire Regiment in Burma 1944-45
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This account has been edited by removing personnel remarks and adding date headers
16th January
The 1/15th Punjab Regt. can claim the honour of being the first across the Irrawaddy. This unit was officially the “Divisional H.Q. Defence Battalion,” but in practice was employed for all kinds of especial roles and were attached at different times to Brigades as the situation required. On the night of 15/16 January, the Punjabis got two companies across about 3 miles North of Kyaukmyaung and established a small bridgehead on the East bank. The following night, however, both the 5/10 Baluch and the 1/6 Gurkhas crossed and took over the bridgehead, the two companies of Punjabis being withdrawn to the West bank.
There was little opposition to the initial crossing. The enemy appeared to have been taken by surprise. It seemed as though he neither expected us to reach the river so soon after the capture of Shwebo, nor to cross as far North as we did. The more obvious place to have attempted the establishment of the bridgehead in this area was, of course, opposite Kyaukmyaung itself, terminus of the main road from Shwebo and the place from which in peace-time ran the ferry to the East bank at the village of Ngapyin-in. By avoiding the obvious, however, and taking advantage of the extremely thick bamboo jungle that here clothes the slopes on both sides of the Irrawaddy, we had been lucky enough to achieve surprise.
The actual crossing place, which was used for the first couple of days, was a most inaccessible spot. It had to be reached by a very poor track running parallel to the West bank and mostly through thick jungle. The bank itself, however, at the spot chosen by the Sappers, was open and suitable for the launching of rafts and assault boats. Opposite on the East bank, steep-sided hills covered with thick bamboo jungle ran right down to the water’s edge. The line of the bank, however, was broken at one point by a small sandy beach, and this formed the other terminus of the crossing.
17th January
During the 17th the Jap made two attacks on the bridgehead. Both were successfully beaten off.
19th January
During the afternoon of the 19th the whole Battalion moved South down the river bank along a most difficult track which in places almost overhung the river and which could hardly be negotiated by mules. Two mules actually did lose their footing and fell into the river and were drowned. We went into a perimeter about a mile downstream, which had been occupied the previous night by the Baluch. Meanwhile the rest of the Gurkhas went to reinforce their two companies on Minban Taung, which were already being heavily attacked. The bridgehead perimeter was taken over by some of the Assam Regt. (Div. Recce. Bn.) and the 1/15 Punjabis.
The Baluch by this time had fought their way further South along the bank and established a perimeter around the deserted village of Ngapyin-in. We joined them on the 20th January, and that night were holding the southern half of what was to become the new bridgehead perimeter. The Baluch occupied the northern portion. As soon as this was done, the small original bridgehead was abandoned, and on the West bank the village of Yedaw, a mile upstream from Kyaukmyaung and much more accessible by road than the original western terminus, was adopted as the landing place for the ferry on that side.
The village of Ngapyin-in was to remain for some time the centre of the Irrawaddy bridgehead. As events turned out, the area immediately around it was to be the scene of heavy fighting both offensive and defensive; of attempts by the Japs to drive us back into the river; of our endeavours to break out South-east towards Mandalay.
From the village starts the only motorable track running South for some distance up and down the East bank. Actually, after wandering inland for some distance, it strikes the bank again just North of Singu, a small town about the same size as Kyaukmyaung, a steamer station, and the place from which starts the road to Mandalay. To get control of that was, of course, our real object. A glance at the map will show, however, that whereas the good road from Shwebo already existed on the West bank almost to Yedaw, no motorable track ran South down the West bank to the villages facing Singu. It is true that one was developed as soon as possible, but to have attempted to establish a bridgehead at Singu, without having a motorable road to a crossing place opposite to it on the West bank, would have been creating great difficulties. It was not a question of normal supplies. They could be dropped by air. It was a matter of getting guns, vehicles, and the many other pieces of heavy equipment, which could only come by road across into the bridgehead. It followed, therefore, that until such a track were completed, or until all the heavy equipment was over and we could be dependent on the Air only, the bridgehead was bound to remain with its centre in the area opposite the main road from Shwebo.
Minban Taung, which the Gurkhas were holding, was starting to be somewhat of a problem. It is a big feature, and the nearest water is in the chaung just North of the village of Yeshin. This water point was, however, at first held by the Japs, and to start with the Gurkhas fetched all their water from the river in the area of the original bridgehead. It was a long carry and the water parties needed protection as the enemy tried to interfere with them. It became obvious that further problems such as the evacuation of wounded would soon arise unless a line of communication was secured between Minban Taung and the bridgehead at Ngapyin-in. It was not a great distance and either of the two tracks running eastward toward Yeshin would serve the purpose. The Gurkhas, however, had been attacked in their position and it was a question of finding out what opposition lay between them and the bridgehead.
20th January
On the 20th January, therefore, when the rest of the Battalion was moving South to join the Baluch at Ngapyin-in,” D “ Coy. under Major Dawe was ordered to go to a certain track junction which became known as Charing Cross, and lay on the more northerly of the tracks to Yeshin. On arrival there the Company was to form a firm base and patrol eastward. It was to prove merely the first of a series of attempts to reach Yeshin.
21th January
The next day the bridgehead was reinforced by the arrival of the 1/15 Punjabis and a platoon of the M.G. Bn., 11th Sikh Regt., the original bridgehead farther North having been closed down. The Baluch were ordered to get a Company on to a fairly large feature which became known as Pear and which lay about two miles South along the river bank from Ngapyin-in. Meanwhile the Battalion was ordered to find two Companies to go out and clear the road to Yeshin and contact the Gurkhas.
22nd January
On 22nd January another attempt was made to get through to the Gurkhas on Minban Taung, this time with Bren Carriers which had been ferried across the river. Lieut. Bailey with six carriers set out to get through along the main track. “B” Coy. stood by to follow him up. The track was, however, found to be quite unsuitable for carriers and the attempt was abandoned without contact being made with the enemy. The carriers would have undoubtedly been ambushed and no useful purpose have been served.
Meanwhile the Baluch sent another Coy. with a platoon of M.M.G. s to reinforce the one that was already on Pear. One Coy. of the Assam Regt. came into the perimeter to reinforce it.
That night a very determined attack was made on the bridgehead perimeter. Very heavy shelling started as dusk was falling, inflicting casualties on both personnel and mules. The Q.M. ‘s staff laying out rations on the river bank for collection by Companies was completely eliminated by one shell.
Up on the perimeter itself, in the dark bamboo jungle, all hell seemed to have been let loose. Vickers guns were firing belt after belt, D.F. was coming down just beyond the wire, and both sides were using grenades in tremendous quantities. The air was so thick with dust that it was almost impossible to see. It was impossible for the troops on the perimeter to dig in properly owing to the extremely rocky nature of the ground. Stone “sangars” made from large boulders had to be built instead. With the Japs within five or ten yards of the wire firing M.G. ‘s, throwing grenades and attempting to charge home with the bayonet, one would have felt less naked in a deep weapon pit. It is with pride that we record that ours was the only sector of the perimeter that was not broken into that night. Three times the Jap broke through the Punjabis and had to be thrown out with the bayonet. Once he got as far as the Baluch Bn. Headquarters.
23rd January
Next day, 23rd January, another attempt was made to get through to the Gurkhas, this time by Major Hodder with an E.O.O. and “A” and “B” Companies. It met with no more success than previous efforts. “B” Coy., in the lead, on coming to the spot in the jungle where “D” Coy. had had their small action, ran into exactly the same opposition as had been there previously. Reconnaissance revealed, however, that the position held by the enemy was much more extensive than had at first been supposed, covering as it did both tracks running towards Yeshin.
It may be mentioned that fighting or marching through jungle is a slow business. True, this was only bamboo jungle, which is not really dense, growing as it does in clumps about 5 yards apart and allowing visibility of about 20 yards. But the difficulties of map-reading are great. The only safe and sure way is to proceed on a compass bearing with men pacing to check the distance covered. The result is that the whole column goes in single file and is therefore most unwieldy. The leading troops have to proceed with the utmost caution as they are apt to find themselves right on top of an enemy position before they realise it. In addition, owing to the untidy way in which bamboo grows, branches are inclined to get caught up in the loads on the mules’ backs. Easy passage is denied to stretcher-bearers carrying wounded. Their task is often made more difficult by the fact that the ground is often covered with large boulders and intersected with deep-sided ravines. For four men to try to carry a wounded comrade in moderate comfort over such ground is far from easy. It is tiring enough for an unencumbered man. It may be imagined, therefore, that to get a whole column, including mules and wounded, through jungle is a tiring business calling for considerable patience.
24th January
By the 24th January the position of 1/6 Gurkhas on Minban Taung was getting desperate. They were practically surrounded and had been repeatedly and heavily attacked. They had wounded who they had been unable to evacuate. They were short of ammunition and food. The R.A.F. pilot of the Dakota, which was just about to drop supplies to them the previous day, had been fired on from the ground by the Jap and wounded. He just managed to reach his base, but without dropping the supplies so urgently needed by the Gurkhas.
Accordingly, the whole Battalion was ordered to go out on the 24th as a relief column to them. The Divisional Commander said that the column must get through if it was humanly possible to do so. As it turned out, this small expedition was completely successful. The Bn. went in two columns, a fighting column consisting of “C” and “A” Coys. under the Commanding Officer with an F.O.O., and a relief column consisting largely of stretcher parties and extra food and ammunition on mules escorted by “B” and “D” Coys. under the Second-in-Command. An early start was made and a new line of advance was tried. Instead of attempting to get through on the track to Yeshin, both columns made their way northwards along the river bank from the bridgehead for about a mile. From there they struck inland on a compass bearing calculated to clear the northern edge of the enemy position astride the approaches to Yeshin. Some slight opposition was met on the way out, but was brushed aside with very minor casualties. The supplies and ammunition were delivered, the Gurkha wounded were collected, and both columns got back to the perimeter by nightfall without further incident.
25th January
On the 25th, apart from an air-strike against the Jap position on the Yeshin road, there was little activity. The Bn. rested except for sending out some patrols and dealing, of course, with the usual “Jitter Parties” on the perimeter at night. As usual, also, there was some shelling.
26th January
It had been decided that our Bde. should be relieved in the bridgehead by 62 Bde. We were the first unit to be relieved. On the 26th we crossed back over the river in the evening and went into a perimeter just South of Yedaw.
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1st February
AHJD and his company crossed the Irrawaddy. The tanks came across during that night.
2nd February
Between the 26th January and the 2nd February, when we re-crossed the river into the bridgehead, the Bn. was supposed to be resting.
Meanwhile, in the bridgehead across the river there had been furious fighting. On the night of the 29th a more than usually heavy attack was made on Pear, now held by the Rajputana Rifles. Pear was directly opposite the Bn. H.Q. position at Nwenyein, and that night those of us in it got no sleep; apart from the noise we got a proportion of the “overs.” On the night of the 30th a very determined attempt was launched against the bridgehead in addition to the usual attack on Pear. Again we got no sleep and again we got a share of the “overs.” 1/6 Gurkhas, who were relieved by the Welch, had the greatest difficulty in getting back inside the bridgehead. They found their way barred by the Jap and fought all one day without getting through, sustaining considerable casualties. They formed a perimeter for the night in the jungle and arrived in the bridgehead next day.
On the 1st February we left our positions South of Kyaukmyaung and changed places with the Baluch, who were in a position near the main Shewbo road. Next day, starting at 1400 hrs., we re-crossed the Irrawaddy into the bridgehead, coming under command of 62 Bde. It was decided that we should take over Pear from the Rajputana Rifles. As our Companies were so weak, however, it was realised that the whole Battalion would be needed to hold the feature. The Baluch and the Rajputana Rifles, who had held it up to the present, being much stronger in numbers, had never had more than two Companies there.
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We were only on Pear until the morning of the 7th February, and’ generally speaking, had an easy time compared to the other two units who had been there before us. By the time we arrived, however, the importance of this feature had grown to such an extent that it was regarded as no less than a XIV Army commitment, which had to be held at any cost. No account of the fighting in the Irrawaddy bridgehead would be complete without a short description of it.
Pear is a big rocky feature, getting its name from its shape, the lower slopes of which are covered in fairly thick bamboo jungle thinning away towards the top, which has only a few stunted trees on it. There is no water nearer than the river 500 ft. below. On the top at the southern end were two pagodas, which formed the most admirable, ranging marks for enemy artillery. It owed its importance to its dominating position. Not only did it give good observation up and down the river for a considerable distance, but whoever was in occupation of it could see any movement in the country for miles around. It was not to be wondered at that the Jap, realising its importance too late, had tried repeatedly to drive us off it. The top, which has two terraces, is fairly flat and little more than 200 yards long. It was round the lower of these two terraces that the perimeter ran.
There were no less than ten F.O.O.‘s and flash-spotting Gunner officers in occupation when we arrived, all controlled by a “Master Gunner.” The whole hill was ringed by S.O.S. tasks, which could be asked for individually according to where an attack was expected to be coming in, or collectively on the Code word “PIG.” It had been found by experience that unless the S.O.S. came down quickly when asked for, the Jap got inside between it and the wire. As a result, the Gunners had reduced things to a fine art. Not only did they bring their fire down so close that everyone had to keep his head very well down indeed in his hole, but they answered the call for fire in literally about 10 seconds. “PIG” when it came down was such a frightening affair that no one, even in the worst Jap attack, had ever dared to ask for more than half of it at a time. The garrison was supplied by air drop in the middle of the perimeter. As the area was very small, everyone had to take cover while a “drop” was on, and when they emerged to collect it they were invariably shelled. Being shelled on Pear was far from pleasant.
Owing to the nature of the ground, which was almost solid rock, stone “sangars” had to be built up instead of digging trenches. Splinters flew in all directions when shelling took place. For the same reason it was impossible to bury the dead properly. One merely covered them with piles of boulders and used quicklime. Whilst we were generally able, however, to recover our dead except for men lost on patrol, the Japs could not recover the large numbers of theirs who were killed in attacks at night on the perimeter, and they were left to rot where they lay, mostly in the jungle just out of sight of the perimeter over the crest of the hill, but at no great distance from it. With the hot sun beating down on the rocky surface, the stench was almost unbearable. It can be imagined that Pear was not a pleasant spot.
While the Battalion was on Pear, there were the usual Jitter Parties by night and a certain amount of shelling, including shelling of our water party on the river bank. There was, however, no really heavy attack. Lieut. Price, of “D” Coy., unfortunately died on the 5th February from wounds received when out on patrol round the southern slopes that morning. Apart from him, however, there were only one or two minor casualties. These were evacuated by boat from the river bank at a point where an under-feature known as TIT existed, and which was garrisoned by “A” Coy. under Capt. Maycock Evacuation of casualties by land was too risky as the Japs were apt to lay strong ambushes on the track from the bridgehead to Pear, which were difficult to avoid and troublesome to dislodge.
3rd February
On the 3rd February, another effort was made to gain control of the road from the bridgehead to Yeshin. The Bde.Commander of 62 Bde with 4/6 Gurkhas and a squadron of tanks which had been brought across the river, set out along the main track. The Jap waited until they reached Yeshin and then brought down very heavy and accurate shellfire on them. The Gurkhas suffered some 160 casualties and also lost most of their mules. The column returned to the bridgehead next day.
By this time a dust track had been completed from a point about two miles West of Kyaukmyaung on the main Shwebo road down to Shwedaik on the West bank opposite Kule, a village below the Southern end of Pear. If Kule and the ridges to the East of it could be captured, the bridgehead could be extended southward nearer to the Mandalay road running from Singu, a ‘new crossing place over the river could be established between Shwedaik and Kule, and it might be possible to avoid using the Yeshin route to Singu, which had proved such a difficult task to gain control of.
An operation to capture Kule was accordingly planned, and the Battalion would have the task of capturing it.
The battle of Kule marked the turning point of the bridgehead fighting, for it was the first blow of a series which cracked the Japs cordon round the bridgehead and opened the way for the advance on Mandalay. It was probably the stiffest fight the Battalion had in Burma, and it will therefore be described in some detail.
Kule is a small village lying one mile to the South of Pear, as already mentioned, and contains the only crossing of a swamp and chaung connecting the Lakes East of Pear with the Irrawaddy. One mile to the North-East are three features which came to be known as ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE.
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8th February
On February 7th the Battalion was on Pear, and in the afternoon received a warning order to prepare for the attack next day, the 8th. At first light the Battalion moved down to Tit, and here joined up with half a squadron of 150th Regt. R.A.C. (Grant Tanks). Although we had tanks, other support was very poor, the Artillery being limited to 15 rounds per gun for the whole day. There was also a small Air strike of half a squadron of Hurribombers. One platoon of M.M.G.’s were under command.
The advance started with “A” and “D” Companies leading, but as the ground narrowed between Pear and the river, “D” dropped behind “A.” As the end of this defile was reached, the track slipped under the third tank, which fell about 15 feet on to the river bank below, and the track was for a time impassable. “D” Coy now pushed out to the East to cover the left flank, while “A” advanced towards the village half a mile away. No opposition was met until the leading troops had almost reached the hedge surrounding the village, and this was quickly brushed aside. About 50 yards inside the village, however, “A” Coy came under considerable fire from snipers in trees. Capt. Maycock was wounded seriously in the leg, and Lieut. Bailey took over the Company. “B” Coy was now sent up to reinforce A Coy and together a little more ground was gained. At about 1700 hrs. the C.O. decided that we should dig in where we were, with the platoon of machine guns in support.
While digging was in progress, the Jap kept up considerable sniping fire, and as it grew dark he became bolder. Small parties started crawling up to the perimeter. There was no wire available, and in several places huts just outside the perimeter gave an excellent covered approach to the enemy.
Throughout the night the Japs kept attacking first one part 0f the perimeter and then another. The bulk of the fighting was on “A” and ‘B” Companies’ fronts. One platoon of “B” Company was pushed back about ten yards into a chaung, but there they held. Towards dawn an officer and five Japs crawled up with the intention of silencing “A” Company’s 2inch mortar. The officer leapt into the mortar pit and, shouting “Banzai !“ started laying about the No. of the mortar with his sword. Company H.Q. immediately counter-attacked and the officer and his party were killed.
9th February
After it got light, the sniping continued, and the position was none too satisfactory. However, about 0900 hrs a Company of the 4/6 Gurkhas arrived and one troop of tanks. The C.O. then issued orders for the clearing of the rest of the village, the 4/6 Gurkhas on the right with the tanks, and one platoon of “B” Company and the Pioneer Platoon on the left. Unfortunately the Gurkhas were late in starting, and the Pioneer Platoon came under heavy fire from snipers, suffering nine casualties in ten minutes. In getting out the wounded, “B” Company also sustained casualties. A second co-ordinated attack was then made, this time with great success. All the North side of the village was cleared, allowing the 3/6 Rajputana Rifles (62 Bde.) to pass through and capture Able, Baker, and Charlie, which were not very strongly held.
The above attack on the North side of Kule was carried out by Lieut. Coombe and his platoon, working along a narrow strip of country with open ground on their right and a deep chaung on the left. They stormed their way along and cleared the ground for some 200 yards. In all they accounted for one officer and 19 O.R.’s killed, and captured one M.M.G., 2 L.M.G.’s, 1 grenade discharger and one sword, together with a number of rifles, and a quantity of equipment and documents. Their own casualties were nil.
During that night there were one or two Jitter Parties round the perimeter, and a scare when a post near the river thought it heard boats being rowed close by. This proved to be unfounded. The next day in the morning the Battalion was relieved, and moved back to Tit for two days’ rest.
Around Kule we counted over 70 Jap bodies, including four officers. One of these was identified as Col. Asano Kuroichi, commander of the 119th Infantry Regiment. Our booty included two M.M.G.’s, 5 L.M.G.’s, 3 grenade dischargers, and four swords.
The success of this operation was greatly assisted by the support given us by the 150th Regt. R.A.C. and the 4th Indian Fd. Regt. I.A., while the M.G. Bn. 11th Sikh Regt. did magnificent work on the perimeter. The Jap always makes for our M.M.Gs, and one of the guns had three dead Japs within two yards of its position.
This attack earned the special congratulations of the Divisional Commander. Real headway had at last been made in breaking out from the bridgehead, and the period of defensive fighting was at an end.
10th February
Back at Tit the Bn. went into Bde. reserve, reverting to command of 64 Bde. Our somewhat depleted ranks were made up by reinforcements consisting of 6 officers and about 100 O.R. s.
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12th February
On the 12th February the Bn. moved South again through Singu, important town on the river two miles South of Kule, and terminus of the road from Mandalay, which had been cleared by the 1/6 Gurkhas after a stiff fight. The objective was the village of Ngasingu, about three miles along the Mandalay road and slightly to the North of it. A considerable amount of opposition was met, however, and in the scrub and long grass, which covered all that stretch of country lying immediately behind Singu, it was extremely difficult to locate the enemy and clear him out.
13th February
It was not until late in the afternoon of the 13th, after an attack supported by tanks, that the Japs withdrew, and the Bn. went into a perimeter at a small place called Myingan, on the road itself about a quarter of a mile from Mgasingu. Our Medical Officer,
During the next few days efforts to advance farther down the Mandalay road in the face of strong opposition were made by the other two units of 64 Bde., with, however, only limited success. The Bn. went into reserve at Singu on the bank of the river, to enjoy a well-earned rest. We had an opportunity to wash and bathe.
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26th February
It became apparent during this period, which was one of intense patrol activity for the other two Bns. of the Bde., and to a lesser extent for ourselves, that there were a large number of Japs still in the area. The bridgehead now had its centre round Kule, the new ferry being in operation, and we had gained control of the end of the Mandalay road in the Singu area, but attempts to advance farther produced violent reaction from the Japs. Both 1/6 Gurkhas and 4/10 Baluch were viciously shelled and attacked in their positions. Singu itself, where Div. H.Q. had been set up, was shelled. During one night the enemy infiltrated back into Kule, and attempts were made to disrupt our cross-river traffic. The Jap was, in fact, preparing his second attempt to drive in the bridgehead, and he did, in fact, during this period announce in his English News Bulletin that: “Having allowed the whole of the 19th Indian Division to get across the Irrawaddy, the Imperial Japanese Army have driven them back into the river and eliminated the Singu bridgehead.”
The Jap was not, however, allowed to continue with his counterattacks for long, for a Divisional attack to break out in strength and move South towards Mandalay was planned to start on the 26th. The Bn. left Singu on the 22nd and for three days returned to Myingan, to allow the Baluch to get a few days’ rest in Singu, before this attack began.
The first phase of this attack was to be an advance along the line of the Mandalay road, to be carried out by 64 Bde. This was to be followed almost immediately by the other two Bdes. operating down the right flank, between the road and the river, and constituting the main threat to the enemy position.
The attack by 64 Bde. was planned in four phases, all of which it was hoped would be completed in one day. Phase 1 was to be the task of 1/6 Gurkhas. Phases 2 and 4 were to be carried out by the Battalion, while Phase 3 was to be completed by the Baluch. This, as it turned out, was a somewhat ambitious programme, as it was not until March 2nd, five days later, that the Battalion occupied the village of Nyaungwun, the objective of Phase 4.
1/6 Gurkhas completed Phase 1 on the 26th, although not without fairly heavy casualties. The Battalion then passed through, but although little opposition was met, the difficult nature of the ground, which at this stage was mostly tall elephant grass and belts of bamboo, made progress slow. The night found the Battalion with two Companies (“B” and ” D “) astride the Mandalay road, but some 500 yards short of its objective for Phase 2.
27th February
On the 27th the Baluch passed through, but in spite of fighting all day and gaining some ground, they did not reach the objective, for Phase III.
It should be mentioned here that the ground was most difficult. The Mandalay road at this stage runs between an extensive lake on the West side, whilst overlooking it from the East are steep-sided hills covered in thick bamboo jungle. It was therefore virtually a bottleneck, unsuitable for tanks, easily defended and allowing no room for manoeuvre. The capture of such a position when held by the Jap, who is a most stout-hearted infantryman, fighting, as he normally does, literally to the last man and the last round, produced bitter fighting. And it may be added that no air strike was available to help as the Air was needed elsewhere.
The following day the Bn. passed through the Baluch and attacked with the object of capturing the village of Ngwedaung, which was the objective for Phase III. By late afternoon a foothold had been obtained in the outskirts of the village. Enemy opposition was, however, still strong. Japs kept infiltrating round the flanks of the two leading Companies (“ A” and “D “), and as darkness fell the Bn. withdrew slightly into a hastily formed perimeter in the jungle a few hundred yards short of the village. It was an anxious moment. It was found that the enemy had blocked the road behind us, and the Bn. mules and various vehicles which were on their way back to a safer area for the night were shot up and suffered casualties, Owing to the presence of mines, considerable difficulty had been met with during the day in getting vehicles of any kind along the only road available, and, as may be imagined, this hampered the supply situation considerably. An ambulance jeep and a carrier had been destroyed completely by powerful mines and all their occupants killed during the day.
The night, however, was quiet and patrols next morning found that the Jap had withdrawn from the village of Ngwedaung, and a screen was put out to prevent its re-occupation. The Bn. remained in its position for the day and re-organised.
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2nd March
On the 2nd, the Bn. set out to complete Phase IV and it was found that the enemy had withdrawn, so that the village of Nyaungwun was reached without incident. It being still early in the day, we were ordered to continue the advance down the Mandalay road in the direction of Pyindaung, a village which existed only on the map. In this area the leading Companies (“ A” and” D “) came up against another enemy rearguard position. Fighting developed, the Bn. suffering casualties amounting to 3 killed and 16 wounded, before withdrawing slightly and forming a perimeter for the night.
3rd March
The following day the attack was resumed, but as the enemy were in well dug-in positions astride the road, the Bn. by-passed the opposition by swinging South-west down to the village of Shwepyi, which was reached without further opposition. There was, however, a little shelling towards the end of the day.
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6th March
We remained in Shwepyi until the 6th March, very grateful for its welcome shade and good clean water supply. The period through which we had just passed had been made more difficult by the shortage of water. None was available in the dry bamboo jungle in which fighting had taken place. The Jap had oiled most of the wells in the villages through which we had passed. In consequence, every drop of water for both personnel and animals had to be brought up in water carts, of which there were none in the Battalion and only a very limited number at Bde., owing to the light scale of transport in the Division, or else in jeep trailers. Being only surface water drawn off paddy fields some miles back, it was far from clean, but in the rapidly increasing heat we were grateful enough to drink it. There was certainly none left for washing.
While we were in Shwepyi the Baluch and the 1/6 Gurkhas fought the last action of any size before the Jap resistance crumpled up and the pursuit down the Mandalay road was begun. They had a stiff fight for the large hill feature, which dominates the road about a mile beyond Shwepyi. As this was a very strong natural position, however, the resistance might have been much more prolonged than it was. However, the advance of the other two Bdes. on the right flank across the more open country bordering the river had been spectacular, and there is no doubt the Japs were taken by surprise. Finding themselves in danger of being cut off, their troops in the Shwepyi area began to retreat, and when the Battalion began to. advance down the road on the 6th the expected opposition did not materialise. The enemy were evidently falling back in some confusion. Large dumps of stores were found lying by the side of the road, bullocks used for drawing transport were left dying of thirst and exhaustion, the dead were unburied, and a few Japs even were willing to give themselves up, being unable to keep up with their retreating column.
Our advance, therefore, on the 6th and 7th was rapid, and except for a jeep being blown up by a mine there was little in the way of incident. We passed through Pinle-In, and, swinging South, spent the night at a small village called Shanywa, about a mile East of the Irrawaddy. “A” and “D” Companies did not halt, but pushed on during the night under the Second-in-Command to occupy the Marble Quarries, only to find them already held by a unit of another Bde.
7th March
On the 7th we swung back on to our original axis of advance, and re-joined the road at Thabyetha, where it crosses a river of some size, the Magyi Chaung. This roughly marks the beginning of the flat, open and cultivated plain of Mandalay, intersected by irrigation canals and dotted with large villages.
The Bn. continued down the road to a point about two miles North of the town of Madaya, terminus of two roads from Mandalay and also a branch of the railway. This town had already been captured by 98 Bde. A force known as Stiletto, consisting chiefly of troops of the 1/15 Punjabis in jeeps, was already only about 4 miles from Mandalay itself, 15 miles or so farther on, at the village of Kabaing, and it was intended that we should push on through the 2 R. Berks of 98 Bde. and assist it, but owing to the road being mined, and for other reasons, this plan did not materialise. We were not sorry, as the last few days had involved hard marching and we were all pretty tired. As it was, the Bn. set off again at 0100 hrs. and marched through Madaya and out into open country that lies East of the main Madaya-Mandalay road. A long and tiring day’s march followed, in which we moved steadily South. There seemed to be some doubt as to what we should be required to do. Eventually about 1500 hrs. we received orders to block two parallel roads running North-East from Mandalay (one of them the second but more roundabout route from Mandalay to Madaya), which it was considered might be being used as escape routes by the Japs. A patrol (under Lieut. Ward “B” Coy.) was sent to investigate a large hill feature called Payangokto Taung, which overlooked both these roads, and found it occupied. The Bn. got into position astride the two roads, with “C” Coy. at Dahattaw and the rest of the Bn. just North of the village of Linnwegyaung. It seemed, however, that we were 24 hours too late. Local Burmans said that the previous night 800 enemy vehicles had passed South down these roads. Even allowing for vast exaggeration, had we been in position then, the bag must have been a good one.
Meanwhile the other two Bns. of the Bde., with Bde. H.Q., had moved farther South in the face of opposition, to the area of Kyaukthanbat, about 3 miles N.E. of Mandalay Hill. 98 Bde. were starting the battle for Mandalay Hill itself, and 62 Bde. had been sent off on an entirely pack transport basis to occupy the hill station of Maymyo 30 miles away to the East. This they did without much opposition, and laid an ambush on the Maymyo-Mandalay road a few miles out of Maymyo, which later took a heavy toll of a Jap M.T. column, which drove into it unawares.
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9th March
The Bn. spent some days in the vicinity of Payangokto Taung. It was evident that there were still a number of the enemy trying to break South from the area to the N.E. of Mandalay, and others immediately East and N.E. of the city itself. A platoon of “A” Coy. attempted to get to the top of Pyangokto Taung on the night of the 9th, but failed in the face of opposition, although the following morning the whole Coy. occupied the feature, finding the enemy gone. During the night of the 9th, “C” Coy.’s perimeter near Dahattaw was rushed, one man being killed and two wounded.
On the 12th March the Bn. moved South to join Bde. H.Q. at Patheingale, 4/10 Baluch having moved farther South to occupy an important feature four miles East of Mandalay called Yangindaung. 1/6 Gurkhas had been loaned to 98 Bde. for the attack on Mandalay itself.
The following day we moved again, and with Bde. H.Q. took up the position occupied the previous day by the Baluch, they having gone still farther South to Kyaukmiywa, an important cross-roads on one of the escape routes to the South-East of the city.
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14th March
On the 14th the Bn. moved in toward the city and the next day took over from 4/4 Gurkhas (98 Bde.), who were by that time in position facing the East wall of Fort Dufferin. “C " Coy., under Major Bailey, were detached in a somewhat exposed position about 500 yards South of the main Bn. position, while’ A ‘Coy., under Major Sykes, were about 200 yards in front of Bn. H.Q., nearer the Fort.
By this time the battle for Mandalay and Fort Dufferin in particular was in full swing. Mandalay Hill, a bare and rocky height crowned by a monastery and huge pagodas, which dominates the whole city from the North, had fallen after bitter fighting to troops of 98 Bde. A night attack by Gurkha troops had dislodged the Japs in the first place, but it required more troops, using barrels filled with oil and petrol, which they rolled into the labyrinth of passages under the pagodas and set alight, to complete the clearance of the hill. Now there was a platoon of Sikh M.M.G. ‘s on top, who were able to harass the Japs in the city below, and in the Fort in particular, all day. The Jap was not, however, by any means trapped in the Fort. He still commanded at least one road out to the South, and held the greater part of the city, which lay South and West of the Fort.
Fort Dufferin itself deserves description, It was a very formidable fortress to tackle. It is actually a cantonment about a mile square and surrounded by walls which, on the outside, are about 18ft. high. Owing to the earth being banked up on the inside, they are of immense thickness. Outside the walls runs a moat of no less than about 30 or 40 yards in width, which has water in it of varying depths.
Patrols of other units had soon discovered that the Jap had not only the bridges over the moat, but also the strip of ground between the moat and the walls well covered by L.M.G. fire and other weapons. His bunker positions were within the thickness of the wall itself and sufficiently far above ground level to make it almost impossible to throw grenades into them. Various air strikes by Hurribombers dropping 500 lb. bombs with the object of breaching the walls had little effect. It certainly looked at this stage as though we were going to be faced with an attack by storm on the lines of Badajos, of Peninsular War fame, with storming ladders and desperate hand-to-hand fighting in the breach, involving probably a considerable loss of life.
15th March
On 15th March, “B” Coy. moved South to the area of the Leper Asylum, the object being to establish a road block on one of the possible Jap lines of withdrawal. This move promptly produced Jap shelling in the area, including the Leper Asylum itself. As the inmates included a number of Nuns, Missionaries and children under their car, who had been collected from all over Northern Burma by the Japs and interned there, it was decided to evacuate them. They had already suffered one or two casualties from the shelling. The necessary transport was procured and 160 of these unfortunate people were evacuated and handed over to the Civil Authorities; 20 remained-behind to look after 200 Lepers. We were the first British troops they had seen since the retreat of 1942. To say they were pleased to see us is to state the case mildly.
It had been decided that on the same day “A” Coy. should occupy a walled enclosure and cluster of pagodas known as Teiktaw, some distance forward towards the East wall of the Fort. Accordingly a platoon was sent at first light to find out. whether the position was occupied or not. As it was found that the position was held in some strength, the platoon was withdrawn and a Company attack was ordered for mid-day. This was preceded by a six-inch How. firing from “A” Company’s area to breach the wall of Teiktaw so as to make an entry for tanks. This was followed by an air strike and at 1145 hrs. by a concentration of Artillery. “A” Coy. then attacked, supported by two troops of medium tanks, and occupied the position, finding little opposition left, and suffering negligible casualties, a most successful small engagement.
16th March
There was little activity the following day in the Bn. area, though elsewhere the clearance of the city on the West and South sides of the Fort continued slowly but steadily, and M.M.G.’s and Artillery continued to harass the enemy in the Fort itself. That night, however, the whole of “D” Coy.,’ under Major Lash, was ordered to do a patrol across the moat, and enter the Fort through one of the breaches that had by this time been made in a number of places in the North and East walls by our gunfire, if they could do so unobserved. The object of this was to find out if the Fort were still occupied, as the Japs had been keeping rather quiet, and it was considered very likely that they were in process of evacuating their position. The orders were that if the patrol was fired on or if it could see or hear Japs still in occupation it was to withdraw. Investigation soon showed that the Japs were still inside the Fort in strength and sounds of talking and digging were to be heard all along the wall. No attempt was therefore made to take the Coy. across the moat, and it withdrew without a shot being fired by either side.
18th March
On the 18th, “B” Coy., still in their position by the Leper Asylum, reported Jitter parties the previous night, and during the night 18th-19th they were attacked with L.M.G.’s, grenade dischargers, and a B.M. gun, which the Japs brought up very close and fired into their perimeter all night. They suffered a number of casualties, including the F.O.O., who was with them and who was killed. In the morning they were reinforced by two platoons of “D” Coy., and later the same day were relieved by a Coy. of 3/6 Rajputana Rifles (62 Bde.), who had just come down from Maymyo.
19th March
During the afternoon of the 19th, a concentration of Japs who had been spotted in some buildings outside the Fort to the South-East, and roughly between “B” and “C” Companies’ positions, was successfully engaged by the mortar platoon. Locals came in and reported afterwards that the enemy had been thrown into confusion and had suffered numerous casualties.
In the meantime preparations were going forward for a large-scale attack on the Fort on 22nd March. A few days previously a night attack had been carried out by troops of two units, one at the North-West and one at the North-East corner of the moat, simultaneously. Although some men were got across the water without being spotted, the Japs had the breaches in the walls well guarded, and it proved impossible, with these filled with piles of steep lo9se rubble, to press the attack with any hope of success unless very heavy casualties were to be accepted. The attack was therefore called off, and during the days that followed much more extensive breaching 0f the walls on the North, West, and East fronts was carried out. It was the intention that the Fort should be attacked in strength on three sides with all possible support. The Battalion would have the East side as its task.
On the 19th, Mitchell bombers came over to recce. for a big air-strike on the North Wall of the Fort the following day, and 6inch Hows. continued to batter at the breaches already made. On this day, too, sounds of gunfire could be heard away to the South-West of the city, where 2 Div. were steadily drawing nearer. They had made an opposed crossing of the Irrawaddy below the Ava Bridge some time after we had made our crossing, and had since been fighting their way slowly toward Mandalay from that side.
20th March
The air strike on the 20th by two squadrons of Mitchells was a tragedy for the Bn. It was timed for 1100 hrs., but through some error no warning was sent to the Battalion that we were required to move back some 400 yds. farther from the Fort, in case the bombing should be inaccurate, until a few minutes before the strike began. It was then too late to move. Even so there should have been no real danger as the target was some 1000 yds. away from us in the centre of the North Wall. But the bombs fell inexcusably far wide 0f the mark, and one stick of 2000 lb. bombs dropped right in the Bn. area. Had the ground not been fairly soft, the casualties must have been heavy indeed. As it was, we suffered casualties amounting to six killed and 18 wounded.
It was thus bitter news indeed for us when we learnt a couple of hours later that the Japs had evacuated the Fort the previous night under cover of darkness, and that the 1/15 Punjabis and Baluch were already entering from the North side. After all the preparations for the attack on the 22nd, it was rather an anti-climax.
21st March
On the 21st March we saw History made; the Union Jack hoisted anew over the ruins of Government House in Mandalay. Of Government House itself, not one brick was left standing upon another. The Fort throughout was a scene of desolation. Not that it was worse indeed than the city outside, which had been repeatedly and heavily bombed by both sides since the first Jap attack on Good Friday, 1942. But somehow one had hoped that the Fort, with its trees and gardens and pleasant European bungalows, might have fared better. But everywhere one looked were torn and shattered houses, acres of burnt grass and desolate gardens. King Thibaw’s Palace was burnt right down to the vast plinth on which it stood.
Major Tipler commanded the Guard of Honour found by 64 Brigade for the Ceremony. Our Corps Commander, Lt.-Gen. Sir Montague Stopford, was there, and, of course, our Divisional Commander, Major-Gen. Rees. The Union. Jack was hoisted by the Commander of the XIVth Army, Gen. Sir William Slim, and we gave three cheers for His Majesty the King Emperor. We expected a speech, but we did not get it. The brief ceremony was over and we marched away.